"Qué Dios es ese que adoras?": The Construction of Spectatorship in Sor Juana's Loa for The Divine Narcissus by Balsa, Miquel A.
FALL 2008 49
“¿Qué Dios es ese que adoras?”: The Construction of 
Spectatorship in Sor Juana’s Loa for The Divine Narcissus
Miguel A. Balsa
Everyone sees what you appear to be; few make out what 
you really are.
–– Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe
 Ovid’s well-known rendition of Echo and Narcissus’ myth, 
undoubtedly familiar to Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, inspired her to write The 
Divine Narcissus, an auto sacramental whose sophisticated loa is the subject 
of this essay.1 From the auto’s title, one might say, Ovid’s myth casts its 
mighty influence upon the loa and sets an array of reflecting images in motion. 
Everything in the play occupies a relative position: no image appears, no word 
is uttered, and no action takes place, without generating its own counterpart. 
The loa is constructed as an endless chain of replicas, each of which becomes 
also an original; everything in the loa, in short, may be seen simultaneously 
as an end and as a beginning, as a cause as well as an effect.
Such features are heralded, first, by the arrangement of the dramatis 
personae, and second, by the dialectical struggles that take place among them. 
The plot, as the reader will recall, revolves around the military and dialectical 
victory of a Spanish-Catholic group of characters over their Aztec-Heathen 
counterparts during the first stages of the Conquest of Mexico; as a result, 
the Aztecs will forsake their “God of the seeds,” embrace Catholicism, and 
recognize the authority of the King of Spain. On such premises, the characters 
appear to be divided in two opposing and complementary groups – to wit, the 
Indians and the Spaniards, or the Heathen and the Catholic. In accordance, 
América, an Aztec woman, confronts Religión, a Spanish lady; Occidente, a 
“gallant Indian,” faces Celo, a Spanish captain; and in the background, the 
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Musicians, a group of Aztec men and women, are matched with an army of 
Spanish Soldiers. 
On first impression, then, a perfectly symmetrical division between 
Spaniards and Aztecs seems to characterize the play. This mirroring structure, 
however, unfolds yet again on closer examination. Each of the two sets of 
dramatis personae is divided into a new set of twin images, with an array 
of internal tensions among them. Thus, within each group there is a female 
character and her male counterpart, and, simultaneously, a collective chorus 
in the background mirrors the actions of the two individual personae in the 
foreground. Furthermore, Sor Juana enhances the architectural complexity of 
her loa by presenting us with a new set of duplicities. The group of characters 
physically present on the stage are set against a different group who are 
physically absent from it, but whose presence becomes, as Valérie Benoist 
indicates (74-75), a paramount element in the structure of the play – namely, 
the Royal Court in Madrid. 
 What these symmetrical sets of characters illustrate is one of the loa’s 
most remarkable characteristics, namely, the complex relation it establishes 
between form and content. This relation plays out in the dialogues between 
different sets of personae by means of which the play introduces some of 
the fundamental conflicts that informed the scholarly, religious, political, and 
social debates that concerned Sor Juana’s and New Spain’s intellectual life 
during the Baroque period. 
Such is the case, for example, of the dialogical battle between the 
Aztecs and the Spaniards, whose confrontation lends the loa to insightful 
readings as an allegorical account of the struggles for the evangelization of 
the Indians in the early stages of the Conquest as well as a literary reflection 
of Sor Juana’s “intenciones de mujer criolla que conocía y se enorgullecía 
del pasado histórico de su tierra,” as Georgina Sabat de Rivers expresses it 
(300). The seemingly straightforward plot reveals the true complexity of the 
issue when considering, as Octavio Paz indicates, the profound theological 
controversy that the Conquest of the Americas and the spiritual status of their 
populations had provoked within the Catholic Church. The New World, Paz 
writes, precipitated a crisis in Catholic theology and the conscience of its 
missionaries, since the existence of the new lands and their populations could 
be interpreted to contradict the verse of the Gospel in which the resurrected 
Christ appeared unto the apostles and bade them to go into all the world and 
preach to every creature. Obviously, the fact that the American indigenous 
peoples did not worship the Catholic god seemed to be at odds with Jesus’ 
FALL 2008 51
words, and the solutions that theologians found to this conundrum, Paz 
states, were numerous and ingenious. Such was the case of the Jesuits, who 
maintained that
the Indians’ ancient beliefs – either by natural grace or because the 
Gospel had been preached in America prior to the arrival of the 
Spaniards – contained a glimmering of the true faith, even though 
only confused memories of the doctrine survived. In the seventeenth 
century this belief was extended and affirmed. It was a viewpoint [...] 
that implicitly undermined the basic principle of Spanish domination 
of America: evangelization. (37) 
Clearly then, Sor Juana’s loa intervenes in a crucial theological debate with 
far-reaching political implications. It is noteworthy that this was indeed quite 
a delicate move on her part; as Anthony Pagden explains, in the context of 
the Spanish American Empire “any judgment on the nature of the Indians” 
necessarily entailed an engagement with “the whole debate over [which] 
the justice of the conquest turned.” Taking sides in this dispute implied 
nothing less than a readiness to offer an explanation “for the structure of the 
whole world of nature and the behavior of everything, animate or inanimate, 
within it,” since each new element introduced would need to be accounted 
for, which in and of itself was a potential threat for the stability of existing 
cosmologies (28).
Undoubtedly aware of these implications, Sor Juana tackled the issue 
with notable prudence and on quite ambiguous terms, in a deft exercise of 
double entendre. On the one hand, the striking symmetry and resemblance 
between the “great God of the Seeds” and the Catholic God, as well as the 
likeness of their respective liturgies, could be interpreted as supporting the 
Jesuits’ viewpoint. In this case, the loa would be performing a perilous 
questioning of the very principle on which the Spanish Crown’s domination 
of the Americas rested, that is, the sacred mandate of the evangelization of 
the indigenous peoples of the New World. But then again, on the other hand, 
the play clearly proclaims the firm and rightful loyalty of the Indies to the 
King of Spain, by means of the customary captatio benevolentiae for the 
auto following the loa:
CELO:
Siendo así, a los Reales Pies,
En quien dos mundos se cifran,
Pidamos perdón postrados;
Y a su reina esclarecida, 
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cuyas soberanas plantas
besan humildes las Indias. (473-78)
Therefore, it is impossible to determine what position the loa takes in the 
debate. The Jesuits’ conclusions, the Crown’s rightful sovereignty over the 
Indies, or even a parodical account of any of the former – all of these readings 
are plausible. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the justice or injustice of the Spanish-
Catholic dominion over native-American peoples is by no means the only 
issue at play in the loa. Rather, an array of different tensions runs throughout 
the play, all of them interwoven with the general frame of the conflict 
between the Catholics and the Heathens. These conflicts are brought up 
– or, more accurately perhaps, insinuated – in dialogues between different 
sets of characters. Let us take, for example, the Religión-Celo coupling. 
Their conversations expose, among other matters, the intricate mechanisms 
that linked the military and religious logics during the Conquest, as well as 
their crucial role in the consolidation of the imperial system at large. The 
allegorical marriage between these characters, the male/masculine Celo and 
the female/feminine Religión, clearly signifies the intimate and oppressive 
interlocking of both systems of control. As soon as the couple appears onstage, 
Religión reproaches Celo his lack of action against the Aztec’s “idolatry,” 
and he replies,
Religión: no tan aprisa
de mi omisión te querelles,
te quejes de mis caricias;
pues ya levantado el brazo,
ya blandida la cuchilla 
traigo, para tus venganzas. (80-85)
By the same token, the loa partakes in the controversy about the role of 
women within the traditionally male-dominated Catholic Church, and about 
the place of women in the intellectual world at large – two major concerns 
of Sor Juana’s, as attested by her Respuesta de la poetisa a la muy ilustre Sor 
Filotea de la Cruz. In this instance, in a manner that brings to mind the way 
in which Sor Juana’s skillful meekness allows her to perform a full-fledged 
intellectual tour-de-force in her response to the Bishop of Puebla, Religión 
claims her right and her ability to wield reason’s light in public. América’s 
defeat at the hands of Celo needs to be fulfilled by means that lie beyond the 
captain’s reach:
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Sí, porque haberla vencido 
le tocó a tu valentía, 
pero a mi piedad le toca
el conservarle la vida:
porque vencerla por fuerza
te tocó; mas el rendirla
con razón, me toca a mí,
con suavidad persuasiva. (210-17)
Softly yet firmly, these verses assert women’s capacity to resort to reason, 
and to take an active role within the public domain. And, although female 
actions need to be wrapped in persuasive softness, they can also fulfill tasks 
that escape the powers of male “valentía” and physical “fuerza.”2
The fact that, as I have tried to show in the previous pages, some 
thorny issues are woven within the play’s seemingly simple and orthodox 
discourse is undoubtedly a significant stance in itself – all the more so given 
the circumstance that Sor Juana’s participation in public intellectual debates 
caused deep misgivings in her superiors.3 Precisely for this reason, the only 
way in which the play could address certain issues while dodging censorship’s 
innumerable manifestations was to perform a dialogue in which the orthodox 
positions and characters would be privileged at every turn. All of the play’s 
conflicts, in other words, end up being resolved in what one might call a 
presentable manner. In consequence, the loa affirms the Crown’s supreme 
authority, it validates political domination for rightful religious reasons, and 
it acquiesces to the subordination of women in the spiritual as well as the 
intellectual realm.
 And yet, I would argue that the loa’s apparent orthodoxy allows for 
quite a different reading. Unorthodox ideas and characters must appear as 
marginal, subordinate, and faulty precisely because only under such forms 
could they ever become manifest. What the play seems to imply is, in other 
words, that only as mistaken and subordinated can the mistaken and the 
subordinated be granted a voice on the public stage – what is considered 
erroneous and marginal, in sum, must be always represented in strict 
accordance with the rules of orthodoxy. And yet the loa, under a prudent veil of 
apparent acquiescence, carries an unexpected message, for it equally exposes 
the extent to which ambiguity is a basic feature of all power relations. In the 
play, the subaltern characters simultaneously accept and subvert the status 
they are forced to embody. On the one hand, the Aztecs, the women, and the 
Americas accept what is granted to them, namely, a voice in a dialogue that 
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is meant to enhance the predominant values and ideas of Christendom, Spain, 
and men. And yet, on the other hand, the subordinated characters succeed in 
inserting their own discourse in such a dialogue – albeit still filtered through 
a privileged hand that writes such as Sor Juana’s – thus exposing the fissures 
and faults in the system that is imposed upon them. 
As is well known, this is precisely one of the artifices that Josefina 
Ludmer identifies in Sor Juana’s Respuesta a Sor Filotea, one of the “tricks of 
the weak” by virtue of which the nun tried to elude the intellectual constraints 
that her superiors wished to force upon her. In situations characterized by 
hierarchic structures of power, the dominant party’s gesture consists in 
allowing the weak to speak, on the clear a priori understanding that the 
privilege of speaking must be used in such a way that the governing discourse 
be adopted by the weak in all their utterances. According to Ludmer, Sor Juana 
would take the opportunity afforded to her by her superiors – the chance to 
exercise a voice of her own – as the only available means for her voice to 
be heard. While seeming to abide by the pact of compliance, however, she 
would be able to encode her message of resistance, as a way of questioning 
the very discursive and normative system in which she was forced to inscribe 
her words (51). Ludmer, in other words, emphasizes the idea that the weak 
need to encrypt their own presence as well as their discourse in order to 
survive in a system in which they are considered to be alien – or “other,” in 
Michel de Certeau’s terms. All adverse situations of power, he writes, force 
the weak to play by the rules imposed upon them by those who occupy 
dominating positions. Operating under adverse circumstances and within 
a hostile “territory,” maneuvering within “the enemy’s field of vision,” the 
weak need to resort to “tactics” instead of “strategies.” A tactic, he argues, 
is “an art of the weak [...]. Power is bound by its very visibility. In contrast, 
trickery is possible for the weak, and often it is his only possibility, ‘as a last 
resort’: ‘The weaker the forces at the disposition of the strategist, the more 
the strategist will be able to use deception.’ I translate: the more the strategy 
is transformed into tactics” (37). 
Along comparable lines, Slavoj Zizek shows how some of these 
tactics may function in circumstances in which censorship threatens to 
thwart and punish any attempt at getting through messages questioning the 
established system and its dogmas. Under such conditions, it is still possible 
to get the subversive message through by resorting to the traditional artifice 
of “inscribing the very reference to the code into the encoded language, as 
one of its elements” (1-3). According to Mabel Moraña, this kind of encrypted 
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language constitutes precisely one of the most remarkable characteristics of 
literary manifestations of the Hispanic Baroque. Indeed, she proposes that 
“[l]a lectura del reverso del texto, la búsqueda de lo oculto y camuflado, la 
interpretación, en fin, de ambigüedades, reticencias, ironías y subterfugios es, 
en efecto, imprescindible en toda aproximación al discurso barroco” (166). 
A Baroque text would be, from this perspective, primordially a configuration 
of “indicios que, expresados muchas veces con el lenguaje y la retórica 
dominantes, se mimetizan con la visión del mundo hegemónica, la remedan, 
parodian o utilizan para sus propios fines” (31). 
In light of these insights, it becomes inevitable to read Sor Juana’s 
loa with suspicious eyes, as it were. Thus, whenever one either affirms or 
implies that under the present circumstances it is impossible to speak one’s 
true mind, what one is actually stating is that one might indeed disagree with 
whatever he or she happens to be asserting at any given point. Or, to put 
it differently, whenever it is known that speaking honestly entails a major 
threat for the speaker, an imaginary question mark looms over the entirety 
of his or her words. And, once the possibility of falsehood is thus embedded 
in every utterance, it is practically impossible to ascertain whether any given 
statement actually means what it seems to mean, or its contrary. Whenever 
honesty is under siege, then, every remark becomes twofold, since it carries 
both the affirmation and the negation of its own predicate. 
To put it differently, one can approach the loa’s words and images as 
exposed through concealment, or, conversely, as concealed through exposure. 
Let us recall, for example, Occidente’s rendition to the Spanish Captain:
Yo ya dije que me obliga
a rendirme a ti la fuerza;
y en esto, claro se explica
que no hay fuerza ni violencia
que a la voluntad impida
sus libres operaciones;
y así, aunque cautivo gima,
¡no me podrás impedir
que acá, en mi corazón, diga
que venero al gran Dios de las Semillas! (237-46)
Occidente’s words are loud and clear. He openly proclaims his rebellion 
against the system that is being imposed upon him by force, and he declares 
that his subjugation is exclusively external and apparent. Moreover, he affirms 
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the inherent pointlessness of attempting to subject an individual’s free will 
by means of violence. 
I would argue, however, that even in the case of such apparent 
openness and honesty as one can find in Occidente’s words, the loa reveals 
more than it actually says. The Aztec’s rebellious stance suggests a critique 
of censorship that exceeds the mere denunciation of the unfairness and the 
futility of Celo’s actions, or the reproof of the abuses and injustices brought 
about by the Conquest. What he exposes is, first, the idea that no military 
conquest can subjugate reason (Grossi 553). And, secondly, what his words 
lay bare is indeed the intrinsic perversity of any system based primordially on 
the recourse to violence. For under the rule of Celo’s sword, even if Occidente 
concealed his rebellious attitude, the possibility that he would acquiesce to 
the captain’s domination due exclusively to his fear would inevitably turn him 
into a suspect. And yet, the same would apply to the “crowned Indian” were 
he actually honest about converting to Rome’s and the King’s authority. In a 
violence-based system, then, suspicion looms over both loyalty and rebellion; 
coercion, in sum, creates and reinforces the very reason that allegedly justifies 
its existence. Moreover, this line of thought could be taken still a little further. 
In light of Machiavelli’s well-known insights, given that honesty in public 
entails a hazard rather than a virtue, it follows that the possibility of sincerity 
would be confined to the interior realm of the individual as the only space 
in which it would have an opportunity to thrive. Therefore, insincerity in its 
many manifestations (double entendres, deceits, silences) would be not only 
comprehensible but also inevitable as a tactic for survival under repression. 
The realm of the public, in sum, would be definitively consecrated as the 
dominion of utter dishonesty. 
A different example of how Sor Juana’s loa might be inscribing the 
very reference to the code into the encoded language as one of its elements 
can be found in Religión’s declared plan to make the Aztecs “see” the “true 
faith”: 
¿Hasta dónde tu malicia 
quiere remedar de Dios
las sagradas Maravillas?
Pero con tu mismo engaño,
si Dios mi lengua habilita, 
te tengo de convencer. (270-75)
In this case, the artifice takes on a different nuance with respect to Occidente’s. 
The explicit affirmation of possibly deceitful intentions behind one’s 
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utterances implies that words do not necessarily mean what they seem to 
be saying. Not necessarily, that is, since the key to the entire play lies in 
maintaining the shadow of a doubt looming over all statements, in suspicion 
haunting all affirmations. In fact, neither Occidente nor Religión mask their 
true intentions. The former openly declares that his surrender is forced upon 
him and that no violence can undermine his true beliefs; the latter candidly 
affirms that she plans to be deceitful in order to convert the Heathen. And yet, 
Occidente declares his resolve to be sincere in order to achieve his spurious 
aspirations (to maintain his loyalty to “blind Idolatry” despite coercion), 
while Religión affirms her decision to be insincere in order to achieve her 
rightful purposes (that is, to trick América and Occidente away from their 
“false gods”). Simply put, the implication would be that one may achieve 
“goodness” or “truth” through “evil” or “deceit,” and vice-versa. A sense of 
ambiguity informs the loa at its very core, and the structure of the play is 
such that a number of conflicting interpretations not only become possible 
but, rather, inevitable; no character, no declaration is complete without its 
own reflection, echo, or counterpart.
 The loa’s enhanced dialectical structure produces yet another curious 
situation, to wit, that from a certain point of view, all dialogues implicitly 
situate participating interlocutors at a level of equality; or, to express it 
more accurately, all dialogues denote the speakers’ parity as “subjects.” 
Émile Benveniste suggests such an insight in his discussion of the nature 
of personal pronouns. I and you, he avers, refer to no other reality than that 
of the discourse; I refers to “the individual who utters the present instance 
of discourse containing the linguistic instance I,” and, by introducing the 
situation of “address,” we obtain a symmetrical definition for you as “the 
individual spoken to in the present instance of discourse containing the 
linguistic instance you.” Therefore, 
[I and you] are always available and become “full” as soon as a speaker 
introduces them into each instance of his discourse. Since they lack 
material reference, they cannot be misused; since they do not assert 
anything, they are not subject of the condition of truth and escape 
all denial. Their role is to provide the instrument of a conversion 
that one could call the conversion of language into discourse. It is 
by identifying himself as a unique person pronouncing I that each 
speaker sets himself up in turn as the “subject.” (218-20)
From this perspective, all of the loa’s dramatis personae become equals in 
terms of what Benveniste describes as “irreducible subjectivity” (220), and 
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such an impression of subjective equality becomes powerfully emphasized 
by the symmetrical configuration of the two opposing camps, as well as by 
the correspondence between characters on each side, which suggests that all 
the personae are but complementary images of a two-fold configuration. 
One cannot help but notice, however, the sharp contrast between the 
sense of equilibrium conveyed by the dialectic and formal structure, on the 
one hand, and the uneven positions that the Spanish-Catholic personages 
and the Aztec-Heathen characters occupy as they fight their ideological 
and religious battle. As the plot develops, the Catholic grouping gradually 
dominates the situation until it finally prevails, at least apparently, when the 
Aztecs proclaim their rendition:
OCCIDENTE:
¡Vamos, que ya mi agonía
quiere ver cómo es el Dios
que me han de dar en comida,
(Cantan la América, el Occidente y el Celo:)
diciendo que ya
conocen las Indias
al que es el verdadero
Dios de las Semillas! (485-92)
The question arises, then, about the meaning of the blatant contradiction 
between the formal and structural equilibrium, on the one hand, and the 
uneven outcome of the plot, on the other. Once again, the loa allows for several 
disparate readings, the most obvious one being that the Spaniards-Catholics 
owe their final victory to their moral excellence and to the spiritual superiority 
of the “true faith.” Then again, it is equally plausible to interpret that the 
symmetry of the dramatis personae as well as the sense of equality inherent 
in the dialogical form itself might serve the purpose of counterbalancing the 
overwhelming privileging of the “normative” at the level of the plot. The 
tension between the form and structure on one side, and the content on the 
other, could be intended, in other words, to disrupt, if surreptitiously, the loa’s 
apparent orthodoxy, and, accordingly, to stress the lack of, and maybe the need 
for, a balanced, rational dialogue between the Heathen and the Catholic, the 
women and the men, Mexico and Madrid. This claim becomes quite explicit 
in the final part of the loa: 
RELIGION:
Como aquesto sólo mira
a celebrar el Misterio,
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y aquestas introducidas
personas no son más que
unos abstractos, que pintan
lo que se intenta decir,
no habrá cosa que desdiga,
aunque las lleve a Madrid:
que a especies intelectivas
ni habrá distancias que estorben
ni mares que les impidan. (462-72)
By virtue of these verses, the play demands the extension of its dialectical 
structure beyond its own textual limits, across long distances as well as wide 
oceans, advocating for a conversation among “especies intelectivas.” And, 
in a comparable move, the final dedicatoria designates the King and Queen, 
the instances of highest authority, as the play’s ultimate interlocutors. I would 
argue that, by metonymy, the royal couple’s vantage is juxtaposed with that of 
the spectator, whose presence is elliptically stated when América invokes4
a sus Ingenios,
a quien humilde suplica 
el mío, que le perdonen
el querer con toscas líneas 
describir tanto Misterio. (481-85)
Thus, the spectators are placed at the highest level of authority. The audience’s 
perspective is elevated to Royal status by virtue of “la horizontalidad del 
texto alegórico,” as Verónica Grossi describes it, given that deciphering the 
allegory’s meaning “no es monopolio de la autoridad sino privilegio del 
entendimiento humano” (545).
As it corresponds to such a preeminent role, the spectator’s presence 
is doubly inserted in the loa by means of explicit designations (the “Royal 
Council,” the “Ladies,” and the “Ingenios”) as well as by means of a general 
appellation to all of Spain’s anonymous “especies intelectivas” who are indeed, 
as Carmela Zanelli indicates, “los receptores que la poeta tenía en mente” 
(184). Moreover, the vital role of the spectator is underlined because the play 
urges him or her to act, to do something, to take action about what he or she 
sees.5 He or she must understand and not let thought be hindered by distance; 
he or she must use his or her wits, and overcome all sorts of impediments. In 
other words, the King/spectator is called upon to engage in a dialogue with 
the play and decipher its meaning. Such an invitation is explicitly issued by 
Religión in verse 249, its paramount importance proclaimed both from a 
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formal point of view (it is located in the exact center of the play’s 500 verses), 
and from the perspective of its content (an inquiry about the nature of God, 
the most fundamental question of all in Catholic cosmology):
¿Qué Dios es ese que adoras?
The call for the spectator to participate, in other words, constitutes not only 
the axis of the play from a formal perspective but also its overarching theme.6 
By placing such a fundamental query at the very heart of the play, Sor Juana 
proclaims that she would not be able to achieve her own purposes without the 
spectator’s setting in motion the loa’s meaning-making mechanisms. Such 
complicity on the spectator’s part entails playing his or her acceptance of a 
part in the loa. His or her fundamental mission consists in trying to unravel 
the uncountable ambiguities and riddles that make up the play, whose “espacio 
alegórico […] desestabiliza todo criterio de verdad absoluta” (Grossi 553-
54). Only when someone engages with deciphering its codes may the play 
come alive and set its meaning-making processes in motion. As a mirror, the 
loa only comes into being completely, or meets its own raison d’être, when 
someone looks into it. 
This point is deftly laid out by Leo Steinberg’s elaboration on the 
paradigmatic example of Spanish Baroque painting, Velazquez’ painting Las 
Meninas (1656). According to Steinberg, the canvas issues an invitation to 
the spectator – a call, I propose, akin to the one that the loa delivers – that 
produces an intriguing phenomenon when he or she agrees to engage in the 
game that the work of art proposes. Once the spectator accepts the summons, 
“the picture reduces the real world and the symbolic world to psychic 
equivalence, like the two pans of a scale, each acted on by the other” (54). The 
painting, through the spectator’s participation, transcends its own inanimate 
condition – or, as Martin Heidegger might call it, its “thingness” – and thus 
becomes a vital presence which makes a living encounter between itself and 
the spectator possible: 7 
If the picture were speaking instead of flashing, it would be saying: 
I see you seeing me – I in you see myself seen – see you seeing 
yourself seen – and so on beyond the reaches of grammar. Confronted 
with mirrors we are, polarized selves, reflecting one another’s 
consciousness without end; partaking of an infinity that is not spatial, 
but psychological – an infinity not cast in the outer world, but in the 
mind that knows and knows itself known. The mirror within ‘Las 
Meninas’ is merely its central emblem, a sign of the whole. ‘Las 
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Meninas’ in its entirety is a metaphor, a mirror of consciousness. 
(54)
As in any vital exchange, then, the work of art becomes the alternate pole in 
a situation of reciprocal self-recognition – of “pure reciprocity,” in Michel 
Foucault’s terms – in which the boundaries between the beholder and the 
object disappear, as both instances become simultaneously the recognizer 
and the recognized.8 This reciprocal game where ends meet beginnings, 
where the spectator becomes the spectacle, and where gazes are ceaselessly 
returned, brings to mind once again Ovid’s mythical story of the boy who 
became perplexed at the sight of his own image on the pool:
Why try to grasp at shadows in their flight?
What he had tried to hold resided nowhere,
For had he turned away, it fell to nothing:
His love was cursed. Only the glancing mirror
Of reflections filled his eyes, a body
That had no being of its own, a shade
That came, stayed, left him – if he could leave it. (99)
Vis-à-vis Echo and Narcissus’ story, Sor Juana’s loa seems to deliver quite 
an intriguing message. As was the case with the young boy’s beloved image, 
her loa comes alive only if and when someone looks at it, or, rather, into it. 
The core of the play, in other words, does not lie in the final deciphering of its 
keys; rather, it happens as the spectator engages in the act of deciphering. As in 
Narcissus’ tale, what creates a beloved image is an inquisitive look projected 
onto a reflecting surface. Desire creates its own objects, as when Narcissus 
bent over the mirroring waters, and then fell in love with what he saw. 
Thus considered, the messages encoded in the loa become mechanisms 
created for the purpose of preserving the play’s own continuity; the alluring 
promise of a secret waiting to be revealed is primordially meant to arouse 
the spectator’s desire to know, to stimulate his or her engagement, and thus 
bring the artifact to life. Or, to express it differently, it is precisely the belief 
that there is a secret to be revealed, or an answer to the riddle, that sets the 
mechanism in motion by enticing the spectator into searching for the keys 
to the artifact. Analogous to the way in which Narcissus’ lover was created 
by the ephebe’s love-struck gaze, the artwork comes into being by virtue of 
the spectator’s desire-driven look. It is the very process of searching that 
produces knowledge, truth, and beauty; the intellectual and artistic pleasures 
that the artifact yields are, in this sense, means as well as ends, perceptions 
as well as fabrications of the onlooker’s. 
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The spectator’s findings, in other words, happen as he or she searches: 
what he or she encounters is not simply an object lying dormant in the outside 
world, waiting to be awakened by a glance. In Sor Juana’s loa, the spectator 
engages in the play because she believes that she can seize its secrets, unaware 
that it is she who creates them. Like Narcissus, the spectator is driven by the 
illusion that what she is looking for exists outside of herself and within her 
reach. The truth and beauty of a work of art originate simultaneously inside 
and outside of the beholder, within and beyond her reach. She constitutes the 
ungraspable object of desire, and is, in turn, constituted by it – as Jacques 
Lacan puts it, “we are beings who are looked at, in the spectacle of the 
world. That which makes us consciousness institutes us by the same token 
as speculum mundi” (75).
It is in the realm of this ceaseless interplay between images and 
replicas where the artwork comes into being. Sor Juana’s play, in consequence, 
resists any attempt at closed interpretation because her goal was precisely not 
simply to elicit but also to maintain the spectator’s acts of elucidation. By 
virtue of her work’s ingenious architecture, the criolla nun turned the world 
into a chamber of mirrors. That was the paradox, she understood: to make 
the world see itself, it needed to look at itself in the belief that it was looking 
at something else, at another world. And by making her world see itself, she 
could see herself seen – she could exist. By virtue of the mirrors in her loa, 
she managed to have her voice seen, at once loud and silent, revealed and 
concealed, uttered through silence.
Princeton University 
Notes
 1 As Lee A. Daniel points out, the loa, initially a brief monologue “entirely prefatory in nature,” 
evolved until, in the hands of Calderón de la Barca and Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, it became a brief yet 
complex one-act play in its own right (6). Arguably the most prolific loa author of Hispanic America, Sor 
Juana wrote eighteen extant loas, some of which are secular-themed brief plays preceding comedias; others 
are “independent,” in the sense that they do not bear any apparent relation to the following longer works; 
and finally, a third group consists of religious or sacramental loas preceding autos sacramentales.
 2 Judith A. Kirkpatrick avers that the “male figures” in Sor Juana’s text are concerned primarily 
with “physical and moral power and domination,” while “the women” are given the true power in the 
play, “for they are the ones directly associated with the all-important word” (57-58).
 3 Shortly after the publication of “The Divine Narcissus” in 1689, Manuel Fernández de 
Santa Cruz, Bishop of Puebla, wrote a letter to Sor Juana under the pseudonym of Sor Filotea de la Cruz 
in which he warned her about such participation in public intellectual debates. In Octavio Paz’ words, 
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“Sor Filotea agrees with the notion that women may study provided that study not make them arrogant 
[...]. Then the author voices a reservation, one that is essential: what a pity that Sor Juana had devoted 
herself to secular and not sacred writing” (413).
 4 In his book “Barroco,” Severo Sarduy brings together two of the most relevant mechanisms 
at work in “Las Meninas,” which, as I am trying to show, also inform the loa – the simultaneous ellipsis of 
the subject as well as his or her centrality are intimately intertwined in the play’s architecture. As Sarduy 
points out, Velazquez’s picture is structured around a “double ellipsis” which is in turn inextricably related 
to the idea of the “subject”. On the one hand, there is the subject as that which is imitated by the artwork. 
In this instance, the ellipsis functions as “absence of that which is named,” as the “crossing out” of that 
invisible external referent in relation to which the painting presents itself “as a reflection,” as the erasure 
of “that which the canvas reproduces, of that at which everybody looks.” On the other hand, argues 
Sarduy, this first ellipsis leads to yet another one that “elevates [“Las Meninas”] to the Baroque,” given 
that the initial “elided subject” unfolds as the “foundation of the representation.” In this instance, the 
subject becomes agent, protagonist, and authority; it operates as the paramount organizing principle–or, 
in Sarduy’s metaphorical formulations, “the king around whom everyone gravitates, and whom everyone 
sees,” “the organizing gaze” and “the one who sees” (79; my translation). 
 5 “A modo de conclusión, se debe describir al espectador ideal de sor Juana Inés en su función 
de intérprete competente y privilegiado de la doble obra teatral […]. Ese lector/espectador ideal de la loa 
y el auto de sor Juana Inés así recombina la hermenéutica de mito, misterio, símbolo, concepto y ejemplo 
en términos de acción poética, agencia teatral y acto devoto” (González-Casanovas 318-19). 
 6 The call to “see” is explicit in several parts of the loa. “¡Abrid los ojos!” exclaims Religión 
in verse 106, and she re-issues her invitation in verses 401-412. As José Antonio Maravall shows, the idea 
of education endorsed by most Baroque writers relied greatly on “attracting the senses” (170). Within the 
general concept of sense-based learning, sight was the privileged means towards knowledge: “En primer 
lugar, porque lo que se ve nos parece cosa insuperablemente comprobada […]. Y aunque el escritor barroco 
guste de poner de manifiesto el ‘engaño a los ojos’ que el mundo nos tiende a cada paso, y aunque sea 
motivo de particular virtuosismo para el artista barroco la técnica del ‘trompe-l’oeil’, lo cierto es que el 
hombre del siglo XVII pone en la vista su mayor confianza. Precisamente por eso se divierte en hacerla 
caer en la trampa. Ese hombre del Barroco valora, sobre todo, aquellos caminos que van de la figuración 
sensible al conocimiento de lo real” (175).
 7 In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Martin Heidegger characterizes the artwork’s ability 
to go beyond its own boundarie – to transcend its “thingness” – as its allegorical quality. The German 
philosopher writes that “[t]he artwork is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other 
than what the mere thing itself is, allo agoreuei. The work makes public something other than itself; it 
manifests something other; it is an allegory. In the work of art something other is brought together with 
the thing that is made” (145-46).
 8 The relationship between the artwork and the beholder as a process of self-recognition 
is also analyzed by Michel Foucault in his well-known essay “Las Meninas,” where he highlights the 
“condition of pure reciprocity” that characterizes the painting: “What is there, then, we ask at last, in that 
place which is completely inaccessible because it is exterior to the picture, yet is prescribed by all the 
lines of composition? What is the spectacle, what are the faces that are reflected first of all in the depths 
of the Infanta’s eyes, then in the courtier’s, and finally in the distant glow of the mirror? But the question 
immediately becomes a double one: the face reflected in the mirror is also the face that is contemplating 
it; what all the figures in the picture are looking at are the two figures to whose eyes they too present a 
scene o be observed. The entire picture is looking out at a scene for which it is itself a scene” (13-14).
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